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Abstract
For the four-state protocol of quantum key distribution, optimum
sets of probe parameters are calculated for the most general unitary
probe in which each individual transmitted photon is made to interact
with the probe so that the signal and the probe are left in an entangled
state, and projective measurement by the probe, made subsequent to
projective measurement by the legitimate receiver, yields information
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about the signal state. The probe optimization is based on maximizing
the Renyi information gain by the probe on corrected data for a given
error rate induced by the probe in the legitimate receiver. An arbitrary
angle is included between the nonorthogonal linear polarization states
of the signal photons. Two sets of optimum probe parameters are
determined which both correspond to the same optimization. Also,
a larger set of optimum probe parameters is found than was known
previously for the standard BB84 protocol. A detailed comparison is
made between the complete and incomplete optimizations, and the
latter simpler optimization is also made complete. Also, the process
of key distillation from the quantum transmission in quantum key
distribution is reviewed, with the objective of calculating the secrecy
capacity of the four-state protocol in the presence of the eavesdropping
probe. Emphasis is placed on information leakage to the probe.
Keywords: quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution,
quantum communication, quantum information processing
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1 INTRODUCTION
Research efforts by many investigators have significantly advanced the field
of quantum cryptography [1] since the pioneering discoveries of Wiesner [2]
and Bennett and Brassard [3,4]. Emphasis has been placed on quantum
key distribution, the generation by means of quantum mechanics of a secure
random binary sequence which can be used together with the Vernam cipher
(one-time pad) [5] for secure encryption and decryption. Various protocols
have been devised for quantum key distribution, including the single-particle
four-state Bennett-Brassard protocol (BB84) [3], the single-particle two-state
Bennett protocol (B92) [6], and the two-particle entangled-state Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) [7] protocol. However the original BB84 protocol is
presently the most practical and robust protocol.
One effective implementation of the BB84 protocol [3] uses single photons
linearly polarized along one of the four basis vectors of two sets of coplanar
orthogonal bases oriented at an angle of 45 degrees (equivalently, pi/4) rela-
tive to each other. The polarization measurement operators in one basis do
not commute with those in the other, since they correspond to nonorthogo-
nal polarization states. At a fundamental level, the potential security of the
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key rests on the fact that nonorthogonal photon polarization measurement
operators do not commute, and this results in quantum uncertainty in the
measurement of those states by an eavesdropping probe [8]. Before trans-
mission of each photon, the transmitter and receiver each independently and
randomly select one of the two bases. The transmitter sends a single pho-
ton with polarization chosen at random along one of the orthogonal basis
vectors in the chosen basis. The receiver makes a polarization measurement
in its chosen basis. Next, the transmitter and the receiver, using a public
communication channel, openly compare their choices of basis, without dis-
closing the polarization states transmitted or received. Events in which the
transmitter and the receiver choose different bases are ignored, while the re-
maining events ideally have completely correlated polarization states. The
two orthogonal states in each of the two bases encode binary numbers 0 and
1, and thus a sequence of photons transmitted in this manner can establish
a random binary sequence shared by both the transmitter and the receiver
and can then serve as the secret key, following error correction and privacy
amplification [9,10]. Privacy amplification is of course necessary, because of
the possibility of an eavesdropping attack [1,3,4]. Using the Vernam cipher,
the key can then be used to encode a message which can be securely trans-
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mitted over an open communication line and then decoded, using the shared
secret key at the receiver. (The encrypted message can be created at the
transmitter by adding the key to the message and can be decrypted at the
receiver by subtracting the shared secret key.)
Numerous analyses of various eavesdropping strategies have appeared in
the literature. A recent review is given in [1]. The present work is lim-
ited to an individual attack in which each transmitted photon is measured
by an independent probe after the photon polarization basis is revealed. In
addition to the individual attack, other approaches include: coherent collec-
tive attacks in which the eavesdropper entangles a separate probe with each
transmitted photon and measures all probes together as one system; and also
coherent joint attacks in which a single probe is entangled with the entire
set of carrier photons. However, these approaches require maintenance of
coherent superpositions of large numbers of states, and this is not currently
feasible
For the standard four-state (BB84) protocol [3] of key distribution in
quantum cryptography, Slutsky, Rao, Sun, and Fainman [11] performed an
eavesdropping probe optimization, which on average yields the most infor-
mation to the eavesdropper for a given error rate caused by the probe. The
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most general possible probe consistent with unitarity was considered [11–15],
in which each individual transmitted bit is made to interact with the probe
so that the carrier and the probe are left in an entangled state, and mea-
surement by the probe, made subsequent to measurement by the legitimate
receiver, yields information about the carrier state. The probe optimization
is based on maximizing the Renyi information gain by the probe on cor-
rected data for a given error rate induced by the probe in the legitimate
receiver. A minimum overlap of the probe states which are correlated with
the signal states (because of the entanglement) determines the maximum
Renyi information gain by the probe. This is related to the idea that the
more nearly orthogonal the correlated probe states are, the easier they are
to distinguish. The upper bound an Renyi information gain by the probe
is needed to calculate the secrecy capacity and to determine the number of
bits which must be sacrificed during privacy amplification in order that it
be exponentially unlikely that more than token leakage of the final key be
available to the eavesdropper following key distillation. The results in [11]
were obtained for the standard protocol with an angle of 45 degrees between
the signal bases. The present work generalizes the probe optimization for
arbitrary angle between the signal bases.
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In Section 2, a detailed review is given of the optimization of the standard
BB84 protocol by Slutsky et al [11]. In Section 3, the necessary conditions
are obtained for the existence of possible extrema of the overlap of correlated
probe states for an arbitrary angle between the signal bases. Section 4 iden-
tifies the possible extrema and associated probe parameters, and two sets
of optimum probe parameters are determined which both correspond to the
optimization. Section 5 determines an analytical algebraic expression for the
maximum Renyi information gain by the probe for fixed error rate and angle
between the signal bases. In Section 6, the simplified approach of Slutsky
et al, which leads to the incomplete optimization, is made complete by rec-
ognizing certain necessary restrictions which were ignored by those authors.
In Section 7, following a review of the process of key distillation, the secrecy
capacity of the four-state protocol in the presence of the individual attack
is calculated. Section 8 contains a summary. (The present work reviews the
results of Refs. [12–14] by the author.)
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2 PROBE OPTIMIZATION FOR STANDARD
BB84 PROTOCOL
In this Section, the probe optimization of [11] is addressed for the standard
BB84 protocol in which the angle between the signal bases is restricted pre-
cisely to pi/4 (equivalently, α = pi/8 in Fig. 2 of [11]). From Section IV and
Table II of [11], one has for the induced error rate E in the receiver by the
eavesdropping probe,
E =
Puu + Puu
Puu + Puu + Puu + Puu
, (1)
where Pij is the probability that if a photon in polarization state |i > is
transmitted in the presence of the disturbing probe, the polarization state
|j > is detected by the legitimate receiver, where {i, j} = {u, u, v, v} cor-
responds to nonorthogonal polarization states |u > and |v >, and the state
| u> orthogonal to |u >, and | v> orthogonal to |v >. The states |u > and
|v > both correspond to Boolean state |1 >, and | u> and | v> correspond
to Boolean state |0 >.
One has
Pij = 〈ψij |ψij〉 = |ψij |2 , (2)
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where |ψij〉 is the projected state of the probe when polarization state |i〉
is transmitted, and polarization state |j〉 is detected by the receiver in the
presence of the probe [11].
From Eqs. (1) and (8) of [11], it follows that
|ψuu〉 = 〈u|U |u⊗ w〉 , (3)
where U is the unitary operator producing the entanglement of the probe
state |w〉 with the signal states, or
|ψuu〉 = (−〈e0| sinα + 〈e1| cosα)U (|e0〉 cosα + |e1〉 sinα)⊗ |w〉 , (4)
where |e0〉 and |e1〉 are orthogonal basis vectors in the plane of the polariza-
tion states of the signal, |w〉 is the initial state of the probe, and α = 1
2
(
pi
2
− θ
)
is half the complement of the angle θ= cos−1 (< u|v > /|u||v|) between the
two nonorthogonal linear-polarization states |u〉 and |v〉 of the signal (see
Fig. 2 of [11]; I also refer to θ as the angle between the two orthogonal bases
{|u〉 , |u〉} and {|v〉 , |v〉}.) Using Eq. (2) of [11] in Eq. (4), one obtains
|ψuu〉 = (−〈e0| sinα + 〈e1| cosα)
(
cosα
∑
n
|en〉 ⊗ |Φ0n〉+ sinα
∑
n
|en〉 ⊗ |Φ1n〉
)
,
(5)
where |Φmn〉 are the unnormalized nonorthogonal states of the probe. Equa-
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tion (5) becomes
|ψuu〉 = |Φ01〉 cos2 α− |Φ10〉 sin2 α+ (|Φ11〉 − |Φ00〉) sinα cosα, (6)
and substituting Eq. (6) in Eq. (2), and using the symmetry properties of the
probe states [11,15,16], and Eqs. (3a), (3b), and (12) of [11], one obtains
Puu =
1
2
(1− d) + 1
2
(d− a) sin2 2α− 1
2
c sin 2α. (7)
where a, b, c,and d, expressed in terms of the eavesdropping probe parameters
λ, µ, θ, and φ, are given by [11,15,16]
a = sin2 λ sin 2µ+ cos2 λ cos 2θ sin 2φ, (8)
b = sin2 λ sin 2µ+ cos2 λ sin 2φ, (9)
c = cos2 λ sin 2θ cos 2φ, (10)
d = sin2 λ + cos2 λ cos 2θ, (11)
Summarizing Eq. (7) , along with other results in Appendix C of [11], one
has
Puu =
1
2
(1 + d)− 1
2
(d− a) sin2 2α + 1
2
c sin 2α, (12)
Puu =
1
2
(1− d) + 1
2
(d− a) sin2 2α− 1
2
c sin 2α, (13)
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Puu =
1
2
(1− d) + 1
2
(d− a) sin2 2α + 1
2
c sin 2α, (14)
Puu =
1
2
(1 + d)− 1
2
(d− a) sin2 2α− 1
2
c sin 2α, (15)
Substituting Eqs. (12)–(15) in Eq. (1), one obtains
E =
1
2
[
1− d+ (d− a) sin2 2α
]
. (16)
Also from Section IV of [11], one has for the overlap Q of the probe states
correlated with the signal received by the legitimate receiver:
Q =
〈ψuu|ψuu〉
|ψuu||ψuu|
, (17)
or equivalently, using Eqs. (2) in Eq. (17), one obtains
Q =
〈ψuu|ψuu〉
(PuuPuu)
1/2
. (18)
From Appendix C of [11], one also has
|ψuu〉 = |Φ00〉 cos2 α + |Φ11〉 sin2 α + (|Φ10〉+ |Φ01〉) sinα cosα, (19)
and
|ψuu〉 = |Φ11〉 cos2 α + |Φ00〉 sin2 α− (|Φ10〉+ |Φ01〉) sinα cosα. (20)
Using Eqs. (19), (20), the symmetry properties [11,15,16] of the probe states
|Φij〉, and Eqs. (12), (3a), (3b) of [11], one obtains
〈ψuu|ψuu〉 =
1
2
(a+ b) +
1
2
(d− a) sin2 2α. (21)
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Next, substituting Eq. (21), (12) and (15) in Eq. (18), one obtains
Q =
[
1
2
(a+ b) + (d− a) 1
2
sin2 2α
] [
1
2
(1 + d) + (−d + a)1
2
sin2 2α+ c1
2
sin 2α
]− 1
2
×
[
1
2
(1 + d) + (−d+ a)1
2
sin2 2α− c1
2
sin 2α
]− 1
2 ,
(22)
in agreement with Eq. (15) of [11]. The optimum information gain IRopt by
the probe is given in terms of the overlap Q of correlated probe states by
IRopt = log2
(
2−Q2
)
(23)
(for the BB84 protocol, as well as the B92 protocol) [11,16–18]. It follows
that IRopt is maximized when Q is minimized.
It is of interest to first limit the analysis to the standard BB84 protocol
in which α = pi/8, corresponding to a 45-degree angle (θ= pi/2− 2α = pi/4)
between the signal bases and also between the two nonorthogonal polariza-
tion states |u〉 and |v〉 of the signal, namely, 〈u|v〉 = cos θ= cos
(
pi
2
− 2α
)
=
sin 2α = cos
(
pi
4
)
= 2−1/2. The conditional optimization in [11] is limited to
this case. In that case, Eqs. (16) and (22) become
E0 ≡ E|α=pi/8 = 1
2
[
1− 1
2
(d+ a)
]
, (24)
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and
Q0 ≡ Q|α=pi/8 =
1
2
(d+ a) + b{[
1 + 1
2
(d+ a)
]2 − 1
2
c2
}1/2 , (25)
respectively, in agreement with Eqs. (15) of [11]. Substituting Eq.(24) in
Eq. (25), the latter becomes
Q0 =
1− 2E0 + b[
(2− 2E0)2 − 12c2
]1/2 , (26)
also in agreement with Eq. (15) of [11].
For any value of E0, the numerator of Eq. (26) has a conditional (fixed E0)
minimum at some point where the denominator has a conditional maximum,
namely, c = 0. (This is further substantiated in the following.) Clearly, the
numerator of Eq. (26) for fixed E0 is minimum when b is minimum. Before
minimizing b, substituting Eqs. (8) and (11) in Eq. (24), one obtains
E0 =
1
2
− 1
4
[
sin2 λ (1 + sin 2µ) + cos2 λ cos 2θ (1 + sin 2φ)
]
, (27)
or
sin 2φ =
2− 4E0 − sin2 λ (1 + sin 2µ)
cos2 λ cos 2θ
− 1. (28)
Next substituting Eq. (28) in Eq. (9), in order to eliminate the variable φ,
one gets
b = sin2 λ sin 2µ+
2− 4E0 − sin2 λ (1 + sin 2µ)
cos 2θ
− cos2 λ. (29)
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In order that b be minimum, so that Q0 can be minimum in Eq. (26), one
requires that b in Eq. (29) satisfy
∂b
∂µ
= 0, (30)
∂b
∂λ
= 0, (31)
and
∂b
∂θ
= 0. (32)
Substituting Eq. (29) in Eqs. (30), (31), and (32), one requires
sin2 λ cos 2µ
(
1− 1
cos 2θ
)
= 0, (33)
sin 2λ (sin 2µ+ 1)
(
1− 1
cos 2θ
)
= 0, (34)
sin 2θ
cos2 2θ
[
2− 4E0 − sin2 λ (1 + sin 2µ)
]
= 0. (35)
Equations (33)–(35) are necessary conditions for minimum b and Q0 .
Equation (33) requires
(ia) sinλ = 0 (36)
or
(ib) cos2µ = 0 (37)
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or
(ic) cos2θ = 1. (38)
Equation (34) requires
(iia) sin 2λ = 0 (39)
or
(iib) sin 2µ = −1 (40)
or
(iic) cos 2θ = 1. (41)
Equation (35) requires
(iiia) sin 2θ = 0 (42)
or
(iiib) sin2 λ (1 + sin 2µ) = 2− 4E0. (43)
A solution to Eqs. (33)–(35), which leads to the optimization given in [11],
is given by
sin λ = 0; sin 2θ = 0; cos 2θ = eθ ≡ ±1. (44)
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Equations (44) satisfy Eqs. (ia), (iia), and (iiia), and therefore also Eqs. (33)–
(35). Next, substituting Eqs. (44) in Eq. (10), one gets
c = 0, (45)
consistent with the conditional maximum of the denominator in Eq. (26), as
declared above.
Furthermore, substituting Eqs. (44) in Eq. (28), one obtains
sin 2φ =
2
eθ
(1− 2E0)− 1. (46)
Since only E0 < 1/2 is considered [11], and clearly E0 ≥ 0, then one requires
0 ≤ E0 < 1/2. (47)
Then substituting Eq. (46) in Eq. (47), one requires
0 < eθ (sin 2φ+ 1) ≤ 2. (48)
Clearly one requires eθ = +1 because if eθ = −1, then Eq. (48) implies
sin 2ϕ < −1, which is impossible. Therefore, one has in Eq. (44),
cos 2θ = eθ = 1, (49)
and Eq. (48) becomes
−1 < sin 2φ ≤ 1. (50)
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Next substituting Eqs. (44) and (49) in Eqs. (8)–(11), one requires
a = sin 2φ, (51)
b = sin 2φ, (52)
c = 0, (53)
and
d = 1. (54)
(Equation (53) restates Eq. (45).) Next substituting Eqs. (51) and (54) in
Eq. (24), one obtains
E0 =
1
4
(1− sin 2φ) , (55)
and therefore
sin 2ϕ = 1− 4E0. (56)
Also, substituting Eqs. (52), (53) and (56) in Eq. (26), one obtains
Q0 = 3− 2
1− E0 . (57)
Equations (57), (44), (49), and (50)–(55) agree with Eqs. (16) of [2]. The
choice of µ = 0 in [11] is allowed because µ only enters through a and b in
Eqs. (8) and (9), and according to Eq. (44), sin λ = 0. In general, however,
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any µ (0 ≤ µ ≤ pi) produces the same optimization. Also, λ = pi satisfies
Eq. (44) as well as λ = 0. Other combinations of Eqs. (36)–(43) may also
yield solutions, and this issue is addressed in Section 4 for arbitrary values
of α.
It is also well to further clarify the arguments of Appendix E in [11]. Note
that according to Eq. (9) above, b is independent of θ, and E0 in Eq. (27) is
clearly least when cos 2θ = 1, since in the last term of Eq. (27), cos2 λ ≥ 0,
and according to Eq. (50), 0 < (1 + sin 2φ) ≤ 2. But then substituting
Eq. (49) in Eq. (27), the latter becomes
E0 =
1
2
− 1
4
[
1 + sin2 λ sin 2µ+ cos2 λ sin 2φ
]
. (58)
Substituting Eq. (9) in Eq. (58), then
E0 =
1
4
[1− b] , (59)
which agrees with Eqs. (52) and (55). According to Eq. (59), E0 is a mono-
tonically decreasing function of b, and the problem of minimizing b, subject
to constant E, can be inverted so that E is minimized, subject to con-
stant b. One also sees by substituting Eqs. (59) and (53) in Eq. (26) that
Eq. (57) is again obtained, and since Eq. (57) results from minimizing b with
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E0 constant, this is equivalent to minimizing E0 with b constant, and is con-
sistent with Appendix E of [11]. This approach to the optimization is further
examined in section (6).
3 Extrema and Probe Parameters
In this Section, conditions for possible relative extrema are calculated of
the overlap of correlated probe states of the Fuchs-Peres probe [11,15] for
an arbitrary angle between the signal bases. Although the standard BB84
protocol with angle pi/4 between the signal bases will be seen to yield the
most information to the probe, sensitivity to practical tuning variations in
this angle can be useful in quantifying tolerances. First, Eq. (22) can be
rewritten as
Q =
1
2
(a + b) + (d− a) 1
2
sin2 2α{
1
4
[
1 + d+ (a− d) sin2 2α
]2 − 1
4
c2 sin2 2α
}1/2 . (60)
Also, from Eq. (16), it follows that
(d− a) sin2 2α = 2E − 1 + d, (61)
19
and substituting Eq. (61) in Eq. (60), one obtains
Q =
1
2
(a + b+ d− 1) + E{
(1− E)2 − 1
4
c2 sin2 2α
}1/2 . (62)
From Eq. (61), it follows that
d = −2E − 1 + a sin
2 2α
cos2 2α
. (63)
Next, using Eqs. (8), (9), and (63), and defining a quantity q to be [a+b+d],
one can show that
q ≡ a+ b+ d = (2− tan2 2α) sin2 λ sin 2µ
+cos2 λ sin 2φ [1 + (1− tan2 2α) cos 2θ]− 2E−1
cos2 2α
.
(64)
Next substituting Eqs. (8) and (11) in Eq.(16), one has
E = 1
2
[
1− sin2 λ− cos2 λ cos 2θ
+ sin2 2α
(
sin2 λ+ cos2 λ cos 2θ − sin2 λ sin 2µ− cos2 λ cos 2θ sin 2φ
)]
.
(65)
It then follows from Eq. (65) that
sin 2µ =
cos2 λ(1−cos 2θ)+sin2 2α(sin2 λ+cos2 λ cos 2θ−cos2 λ cos 2θ sin 2φ)−2E
sin2 2α sin2 λ
.
(66)
Next substituting Eq. (66) in Eq. (64) to eliminate dependence on µ, it follows
20
that
q ≡ a+ b+ d = cos2 λ {(2− tan2 2α) [cot2 2α− cos 2θ (sin 2φ+ cot2 2α)]
+ sin 2φ [1 + (1− tan2 2α) cos 2θ]} − 4 csc2 2αE + 3.
.
(67)
Also, substituting the definition of q, Eq. (64) in Eq. (62), one obtains
Q =
1
2
(q − 1) + E[
(1− E)2 − 1
4
c2 sin2 2α
]1/2 , (68)
where q is given by Eq. (67), c is given by Eq. (10), and E is constant. Since
q and c depend only on λ, θ, and φ, and since E is constant, then Q depends
only on the variables λ, θ, and φ.
Possible extrema of the overlap Q for fixed E must satisfy
∂Q
∂λ
= 0, (69)
∂Q
∂θ
= 0, (70)
∂Q
∂φ
= 0. (71)
In general, Eqs. (69)–(71) may determine absolute or relative maximum, min-
imum, or saddle points in the space of probe parameters. The minimum Q
is sought here. Possible solutions to Eqs. (69)–(71), giving the values of the
probe parameters at the possible extrema, are derived in the Appendix. Each
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possible solution corresponds to one of the combinations given by Eqs. (A-
39)–(A-50), in which the fractions F1, F2, and F3 are defined by Eqs. (A-5),
(A-10), and (A-15), respectively.
4 OPTIMUM PROBE PARAMETERS
Possible solutions to Eqs. (69)–(71) summarized in the Appendix by Eqs.
(A-39)–(A-50) are designated by possibilities (A)–(L), respectively.
Possibilities (A), (C), (D) and (J) are excluded in the Appendix. Possibil-
ities (B), (E)–(I), (K), and (L) all gave the same result, Eq. (A-60). However
they differ in the values of the optimized probe parameters.
First consider possibility (B). According to Eqs. (A-51), (A-54), and (A-
55), one has for the probe parameters λ, µ, θ, and φ:
sinλ = 0, (72)
cos 2θ = 1, (73)
sin 2φ = 1− 2E csc2 2α. (74)
Evidently, according to Eqs. (72) and (66), the probe parameter µ is arbitrary
(0 ≤ µ ≤ pi). In summary then for possibility (B), the optimized probe
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parameters are:
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; sinλ = 0, cos 2θ = 1, sin 2φ = 1− 2E csc2 2α
}
. (75)
Next consider possibility (E). According to Eqs. (A-134) and (A-135), one
has
cosλ = 0, (76)
sin 2µ = 1− 2E csc2 2α. (77)
Evidently θ and φ are arbitrary (0 ≤ θ ≤ pi, 0 ≤ φ ≤ pi). Thus for possibility
(E), the optimized probe parameters are
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; cos λ = 0, sin 2µ = 1− 2E csc2 2α
}
. (78)
For possibility (F), according to Eqs. (A-141), (A-146), (A-143), and (A-
147), the optimized probe parameters are:
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; sin 2µ sin2 λ = 1− 2E csc2 2α∓ cos2 λ, cos 2θ = 1, sin 2φ = ±1
}
.
(79)
For possibility (G), according to Eqs. (A-148), (A-150), (A-152), and (A-
154), the optimized probe parameters are:
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; cosλ = 0, sin 2µ = 1− 2E csc2 2α, cos 2θ = 1
}
, (80)
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or
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; cosλ = 0, sin 2µ = 1− 2E csc2 2α, sin 2φ = 1− 2 cot2 2α, cos 2θ = eθ
}
,
(81)
Equations (80) and (81) are apparently included in Eq. (78).
For possibility (H), according to Eqs. (A-160) and (A-162), one has
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; sin 2µ sin2 λ = 1− 2E csc2 2α− cos2 λ sin 2φ, cos 2θ = 1
}
. (82)
Evidently Eqs. (75) and (79) are included in Eq. (82).
For possibility (I), according to Eqs. (A-163), (A-165), (A-167), and (A-
168), one has
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; cosλ = 0, sin 2µ = 1− 2E csc2 2α, cos 2θ = 1
}
, (83)
or, alternatively,
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; cosλ = 0, sin 2µ = 1− 2E csc2 2α, sin 2φ = 1− 2 cot2 2α
}
.
(84)
Equations (83) and (84) are evidently included in Eq. (78).
For possibility (K), according to Eqs. (A-174), (A-177), and (A-179), the
24
optimum probe parameters are:
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; cosλ = 0, sin 2µ = 1− 2E csc2 2α, sin 2φ = 1− 2 cot2 2α
}
.
(85)
Comparing Eq. (85) with Eq. (78), it is evident that Eq. (85) is included in
Eq. (78)
Finally, for possibility (L), according to Eqs. (A-186), (A-188) and (A-
189), the optimum probe parameters are
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; sin 2µ sin2 λ = 1− 2E csc2 2α− cos2 λ sin 2φ, cos 2θ = 1,
cos2 λ = 2 (1− E)2 (1− 2 cot2 2α− sin 2φ)
×
[
sin2 2α cos2 2φ [1 + (1− 2 csc2 2α)E]
]−1}
.
.
(86)
Comparing Eqs. (86) with Eq. (78), one sees that Eq. (86) is included in
Eq. (82).
Equations (78) and (82) are different possible sets of optimized probe
parameters, both of which correspond to the same optimization, Eq. (A-60).
In summary, the optimized sets of probe parameters are:
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; cos λ = 0, sin 2µ = 1− 2E csc2 2α
}
, (87)
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; sin 2µ sin2 λ = 1− 2E csc2 2α− cos2 λ sin 2φ, cos 2θ = 1
}
. (88)
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For α = pi/8, these reduce to
{λ, µ, θ, φ; cosλ = 0, sin 2µ = 1− 4E} , (89)
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; sin 2µ sin2 λ = 1− 4E − cos2 λ sin 2φ, cos 2θ = 1
}
. (90)
Equation (90), for sin λ = 0, corresponds to the standard optimization in [2]
and in Section 2 above, but, other than that, the two sets of optimized probe
parameters given by Eqs. (89) and (90) were not found by the simplified
arguments appearing there. (Still another set of solutions, holding only for
α = pi/4, follows from Eq. (A-173), and is addressed in Section 6.) Both
Eqs. (89) and (90) (together with Eqs. (8)–(11), (24), and (26)) yield Eq. (57).
It can also be shown that all sets of optimum probe parameters following from
Eqs. (36)–(43) are subsets of Eq. (88), and also yield Eq. (57).
5 MAXIMUM INFORMATION GAIN
In Section 4 and the Appendix, it was determined that the only remaining
possible extremum of the overlap Q of correlated probe states for fixed error
rate E is given by Eq. (A-60), namely,
Q =
1 + (1− 2 csc2 2α)E
1− E . (91)
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I have found that if one plots points using the general expression for the
nonoptimized overlap given by the parametric Eqs. (60) and (16) along with
Eqs. (8)–(11) for a representative range of values of the error rate E and the
probe parameters λ, µ, θ, and φ, for a range of α ≤ pi/8, the nonoptimized
values of Q all lie above the corresponding curves given by Eq. (91). Also, by
explicitly calculating the difference between the optimized overlap, Eq. (91),
and the nonoptimized overlap, Eqs. (60) and (16), for representative ranges
of the error rate and the probe parameters in the neighborhood surrounding
each of the optimized sets, Eqs. (87) and (88), I have found that for α = pi/8
or pi/9, the nonoptimized overlap is not decreasing, and therefore Eq. (91)
does in fact represent a minimum. Also, it is evident from Eq. (91) that the
minimum overlap Q, for constant E, decreases as α decreases below pi/8.
Apparently, the optimization holds for α ≤ pi/8. However, for α > pi/8,
this is not the case (points resulting from Eqs. (60) and (16) fall above and
below the curves given by Eq. (91)), and therefore the extremization does
not correspond to a minimum for α > pi/8. (For example, if α = pi/8+10−6,
E = 0.2, µ/pi = 0.156816, λ/pi = 0.3, θ/pi = 0.1, and φ/pi = 0.75, one
obtains, using Eqs. (16), (60), and (8)–(11), the value Q = 0.500003 for the
nonoptimized overlap; but Eq. (91) yields a larger value, Q = 0.500004. Also,
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if α = pi/5, E = 0.3, µ/pi = 0.0711275, λ/pi = 0.7, θ/pi = 0.7, and φ/pi = 0.7,
one obtains Q = 0.34828 for the nonoptimized overlap, but Eq. (91) yields
Q = 0.909509.)
However, it is at this point essential to note the invariance of the Error
rate E, Eq. (1), and the overlap Q, Eq. (17), under an interchange of the
states |u〉 and |u〉; thus
{E,Q} −→
|u〉↔|u〉
{E,Q} . (92)
Also, from Fig. 2 of [11], it is evident that under the interchange of |u〉 and
|u〉, the angle θ between the nonorthogonal polarization states becomes 2α;
thus
θ −→
|u〉↔|u〉
2α, (93)
or equivalently, since θ= pi2 − 2α,
α −→
|u〉↔|u〉
pi
4
− α. (94)
Also, using Eq. (94), one has
{α ≤ pi/8} −→
|u〉↔|u〉
{α ≥ pi/8} . (95)
It then follows from Eqs. (91), (94), and (95) that the optimum overlap,
Q =
1 + (1− 2 csc2 2α)E
1−E , α ≤ pi/8, (96)
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becomes
Q =
1 +
(
1− 2 csc2 2
(
pi
4
− α
))
E
1−E , α ≥ pi/8, (97)
or equivalently,
Q =
1 + (1− 2 sec2 2α)E
1−E , α ≥ pi/8. (98)
Also, the optimized sets of probe parameters, Eqs. (87) and (88), namely,
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; cosλ = 0, sin 2µ = 1− 2E csc2 2α
}
, α ≤ pi/8, (99)
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; sin 2µ sin2 λ = 1− 2E csc2 2α− cos2 λ sin 2φ, cos 2θ = 1
}
, α ≤ pi/8,
(100)
become, for α→ pi
4
− α :
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; cosλ = 0, sin 2µ = 1− 2E sec2 2α
}
, α ≥ pi/8, (101)
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; sin 2µ sin2 λ = 1− 2E sec2 2α− cos2 λ sin 2φ, cos 2θ = 1
}
, α ≥ pi/8.
(102)
I have found that if one plots points using the general expression for the
nonoptimized overlap, given by the parametric Eqs. (60) and (16) along with
Eqs. (8)–(11), for a representative range of values of the error rate E and
the probe parameters λ, µ, θ, and φ, for a range of α ≥ pi/8, the nonopti-
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mized values of Q all lie above the corresponding curves given by Eq. (98).
Apparently, for α ≥ pi/8, the optimization, Eq. (98), holds.
With the restrictions on α, the maximum Renyi information gain by the
probe is given by Eq. (23), namely, [11–14]
IRopt = log2(2−Q2), (103)
where Q is given by Eq. (96) for α ≤ pi/8, and Eq.(98) for α ≥ pi/8, or
Q =


1+(1−2 csc2 2α)E
1−E
, α ≤ pi/8
1+(1−2 sec2 2α)E
1−E
, α ≥ pi/8
. (104)
Thus for the BB84 protocol, one has
IRopt =


log2
(
2−
[
1+(1−2 csc2 2α)E
1−E
]2)
, α ≤ pi/8
log2
(
2−
[
1+(1−2 sec2 2α)E
1−E
]2)
, α ≥ pi/8
. (105)
For α = pi/8, Eq. (105) produces Fig. 6 of [11], as it must. Also, IRopt in
Eq. (105) increases as α decreases below pi/8, or increases above pi/8. As is
to be expected, it is also evident from Eq. (105). that the standard BB84
protocol with α = pi/8 yields less information than for any other value of α.
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6 OPTIMIZATION COMPARISON
As reviewed above in Section 2, Slutsky, et al [11] had earlier argued that
for the standard BB84 protocol (with α = pi/8), the optimum set of probe
parameters is given by (See Eqs. (16) of Ref. [11].):
{λ, µ, θ, φ; λ = 0, µ = 0, cos 2θ = 1, sin 2φ = 1− 4E} . (106)
In obtaining Eq. (106), Slutsky et al made certain simplifying assumptions,
based on the algebraic form of the overlap function, which yielded the correct
maximum Renyi information gain, but an incomplete set of optimum probe
parameters. In this section, a detailed comparison is made between the
optimization of Ref. [11] and the complete optimization of Section 5.
A solution to Eqs. (33)–(35), and (28) is
{λ, µ, θ, φ; sinλ = 0, cos 2θ = 1, sin 2φ = 1− 4E} . (107)
Note that Eqs. (107) and (10) give c = 0, consistent with the above. Since
µ enters Eqs. (26) and (24) only through the term sin2 λ sin 2µ in Eqs. (8)
and (9), and since sin 2µ sin2 λ = 0, the choice sin2µ = 0 yields a possible
solution, which when combined with Eq. (107) gives the set
{λ, µ, θ, φ; sin 2µ = 0, sinλ = 0, cos 2θ = 1, sin 2φ = 1− 4E} , (108)
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consistent with Eq. (106) and a subset of Eq. (90).
It is to be noted that a more general solution to Eqs. (33)–(35) is given
by
{λ, µ, θ; cos 2θ = 1} , (109)
which when combined with Eq. (28) yields
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; cos 2θ = 1, sin 2µ sin2 λ = 1− 4E − cos2 λ sin 2φ
}
, (110)
coinciding with Eq. (90). One therefore sees that even with the assumptions
of Ref. [11], a more general set than Eq. (106) obtains, namely, Eq. (110).
Furthermore, to obtain a more complete optimization, one must consider the
case
cosλ = 0, (111)
in which case Eq. (28) is not defined. Instead, using Eqs.(8), (11) and (24),
one obtains
sin2 λ sin 2µ = 1− 4E + cos2 λ [1− cos 2θ (1 + sin 2φ)] , (112)
and substituting Eq. (112) in Eq. (9), one gets
b = 2− 4E − cos2 λ cos 2θ (1 + sin 2φ)− sin2 λ+ cos2 λ sin 2φ. (113)
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For minimum b, one then requires
∂b
∂φ
= 0,
∂b
∂λ
= 0,
∂b
∂θ
= 0. (114)
Therefore substituting Eq. (113) in Eqs. (114), one obtains
cos2 λ (1− cos 2θ) cos 2φ = 0, (115)
sinλ cosλ (1 + sin 2φ) (1− cos 2θ) = 0, (116)
cos2 λ (1 + sin 2φ) sin 2θ = 0. (117)
One observes that Eqs. (115)–(117) are in fact satisfied by Eq. (111), and
from Eqs. (111) and (112), one obtains the optimization, Eq. (89),
{λ, µ, θ, φ; cosλ = 0, sin 2µ = 1− 4E} , (118)
which is the missing set in the optimization of Ref. [11].
It is evident that Eqs. (115)–(117) are also satisfied by sin 2φ = −1, and
combining this with Eq. (112), one obtains an additional set of optimum
probe parameters:
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; sin 2φ = −1, sin 2µ sin2 λ = 1− 4E + cos2 λ
}
. (119)
This solution was also not obtained in Ref. [11]. It is at this point impor-
tant to note that, since the analysis in Sections 3 and 4 and Ref. [12] was
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performed for arbitrary α, the possible solution given by Eq. (A-48) was
ignored because it followed from Eq. (A-173) that α = pi/8 and eφ = −1 are
required. However, if α = pi/8, then Eqs. (A-48) and (57) are satisfied for
the set of probe parameters given by Eq. (119).
Also, Appendix E of Ref. [11] addresses an alternative simplification of the
optimization problem, which is reviewed in the above at the end of Section 2.
The problem is inverted so that E is minimized subject to constant b, arguing
that the conditional minimum of E is a monotonically decreasing function
of b for the domain of interest (0 ≤ E < 1/2). In Eq. (59) E is seen to be a
monotonically decreasing function of b, as claimed in Appendix E of Ref. [11].
Furthermore, since in this case cos2θ = 1, then, together with Eq. (112), one
obtains the set of optimum probe parameters,
{
λ, µ, θ, φ; cos 2θ = 1, sin 2µ sin2 λ = 1− 4E − cos2 λ sin 2φ
}
, (120)
in agreement with Eq. (90). However, the optimization given in Ref. [11],
namely Eq. (106) above, is a subset of Eq. (120). Furthermore, if the multi-
plier cosλ of cos 2θ in Eq. (27) is vanishing, then cos 2θ = 1 does not neces-
sarily produce the best E0. Thus if
cosλ = 0, (121)
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then combining this with Eq. (27) yields the optimum set,
{λ, µ, θ, φ; cosλ = 0, sin 2µ = 1− 4E} , (122)
which is again the missing set, Eq. (89).
Also, if sin 2φ = −1, then the multiplier of cos 2θ in Eq. (27) is again
vanishing, and then cos 2θ = 1 does not necessarily produce the best E0, but
sin 2φ = −1 along with Eq. (27) again leads to the optimization given by
Eq. (119). It can also be shown that cos 2θ = 0, for which Eq. (28) is also
not satisfied, leads to no additional optimimum sets of probe parameters.
7 SECRECY CAPACITY
The maximum Renyi information gain, Eq. (105), can be used to calcu-
late the secrecy capacity of the four-state protocol in the presence of the
individual attack. Before calculating the secrecy capacity, a review of key
distillation is at this point appropriate. Let m bits of raw data be received
by the legitimate receiver in the four-state quantum-key-distribution proto-
col, and suppose n bits of sifted data remain following removal of (m − n)
inconclusive bits, and suppose there are eT bits of erroneous data, leaving
(n − eT ) bits of corrected data. Corrected data includes data remaining af-
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ter discarding inconclusive results and also erroneous data as determined by
block checksums and bisective search. Privacy amplification is the procedure
for obtaining a more secure, but shorter, key. This is achieved by removing
from the (n − eT ) bits of corrected data a number s of bits (the privacy
amplification compression level) that is the sum of the possible contributions
to information leakage. There then remain (n− eT − s) bits, and this is the
size of the final key. The privacy amplification compression level s is given
by [19]
s = t(n, eT ) + q + ν + g, (123)
where q is the estimated information leakage during error correction, ν is the
estimated leakage from any multi-photon bits, g is an extra safety margin,
and t(n, eT ) is the defense function. The defense function, in general, depends
on the size n of the sifted data, and on the number eT of errors, and is chosen
appropriately by the legitimate users, in order to effectively defend against an
eavesdropping attack. The defense function t(n, eT ) is the estimated upper
bound on possible information leakage through eavesdropping on the quan-
tum channel. Quantitatively it is determined by the maximum total Renyi
information gain IRT by the eavesdropping probe. (It is proved in [11] that
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the optimum individual attack maximizes both the Renyi and Shannon infor-
mation gain by the eavesdropping probe.) The maximum Renyi information
gain by the eavesdropper is based on minimizing the overlap of the measured
probe states correlated with the disturbed signal states of the legitimate re-
ceiver, conditional on fixed induced error rate. The compression level s must
be chosen so that the probability is small that IRT > t(n, eT ). An attack is
successful if it introduces eT errors on the n bits of sifted data, and yields
a Renyi information IRT > t(n, eT ) on the (n − eT ) bits of corrected data.
The probability of a successful attack must be negligible. In the presence of
noise and channel losses, it is not sufficient, for the security of a quantum
key distribution system, to detect eavesdropping. It must be insured that
the shared data is sufficiently secure.
It is well to recall the privacy amplification theorem [9]. First, however,
recall the definition of the Renyi information IR(l) on an l bit string X having
probability distribution PX(X), namely,
IR(l) = l + log2 〈PX(X)〉 = l + log2
∑
X
P 2X(X), (124)
where the bracket denotes the expectation value. (P 2X(X) is often referred to
as the collision probability.) The privacy amplification theorem states that
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if the eavesdropper’s Renyi information gain IR(l) on an l bit data string is
less than some quantity r, namely,
IR(l) ≤ r, (125)
then the eavesdropper’s Shannon information IH(l−s) on the reduced (l−s)
bit string, averaged over the choice of privacy amplification hash function, is
bounded above, namely,
〈
IH(l − s)
〉
≤ 1
ln 2
2r−s, (126)
where here the brackets denote the average. By choosing the compression
level s sufficiently large, the exponent on the right hand side of Eq. (126)
becomes sufficiently negative that the average Shannon information can be
made arbitrarily small. Thus, given an upper bound on the Eavesdropper’s
Renyi information gain, the corrected data can be subjected to the reduction
procedure of privacy amplification to yield an even shorter string on which
the eavesdropper’s Shannon information is arbitrarily low. The secrecy of
the final key is recovered (but reduced in size) if an upper bound can be
determined on the maximum Renyi information gain by the eavesdropper on
corrected data.
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The average secrecy capacity C ′s of a quantum cryptosystem is the number
of secret bits produced per bit from the transmitter, and is given by
C ′s =Limm→∞
〈
n− eT − s
m
〉
. (127)
Here the limit of a very long transmission is understood in which m, the
number of bits of raw data, is very large.
The numerator of Eq. (127), (n− eT − s) , is the size of the final key,
where n is the number of bits of sifted data with the inconclusive bits re-
moved, eT is the number of bits of erroneous discarded data due to error
correction, and s is the privacy amplification compression level. The average
secrecy capacity, Eq. (127), converges in distribution to [19]
C ′s =
〈
n
m
〉(
1−
〈
eT
n
〉
− tF
n
| eT
n
=〈 eT
n
〉− Limm→∞
〈
q
n
〉)
. (128)
The factor
〈
n
m
〉
in Eq. (128) is the conclusive rate. Since the inconclusive
rate R? is 1/2 for the BB84 protocol [11,19], and remains unchanged in
the presence of the individual attack, the conclusive rate must also be 1/2,
namely, 〈
n
m
〉
= (1− R?) =
(
1− 1
2
)
=
1
2
. (129)
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Also in Eq. (128),
〈
eT
n
〉
is the average intrinsic error rate, and
〈
q
n
〉
is the
average information leakage during error correction. Since the present work
focuses on the information leakage through eavesdropping (represented by the
third term in Eq. (128)), possible additional terms, (−〈ν/n〉) and (−〈g/n〉),
are dropped in Eq. (128) (See Eq. (123)). In the third term of Eq. (128),
tF
n
| eT
n
=〈 eT
n
〉 is the average defense frontier tF evaluated at the average intrin-
sic error rate. In the individual attack, each signal is attacked individually
and in the same way, and it is assumed that the signal states, errors, and
measurement outcomes of the probe and the legitimate receiver are all inde-
pendently and identically distributed [19]. Multiple eavesdropping strategies
are considered with different induced error rates, but the attack is restricted
to the set of strategies yielding the greatest attainable expected Renyi infor-
mation gain for a given expected error rate. The defense frontier tF is, for all
possible eavesdropping strategies, the upper bound on the information leak-
age through eavesdropping, based on an optimal eavesdropper in the limit of
a long transmission. The defense frontier tF is chosen to minimize the chance
of any successful eavesdropping strategy, and, for the individual attack, it is
given by [19]
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tF (n, eT ) = max
e≤eT
{
n
(
1− e
n
)
IRopt
(
e
n
+ ξ
)
+ ξ
[
n2
(
1− e
n
)]1/2}
, (130)
where IRopt (E) is the maximum Renyi information gain on corrected data by
the eavesdropping probe, and conditional on fixed error rate E = (e/n); and
ξ is defined by
ξ =
1
(2n)1/2
erf −1(1− p), (131)
where erf−1 denotes the inverse standard error function. The standard error
function erf(z) is defined by
erf(z) =
2√
pi
z∫
0
e−y
2
dy. (132)
Also in Eq. (131), p is the probability for successful eavesdropping (ITR >
t(n, eT )) on (n−eT ) bits of corrected data and producing eT errors; and p can
be made arbitrarily small. The defense frontier, Eq. (130), was determined by
Slutsky, Rao, Sun, Tancevski, and Fainman [19] by clever use of the central
limit theorem of probability theory, and is constructed to minimize the chance
of successful eavesdropping. Using Eqs. (128)–(130), the asymptotic secrecy
capacity, in the limit of long transmission with m→∞, n→∞, and ξ → 0,
and for q = 0, becomes [19]
41
C ′s|q=0,n→∞,ξ→0 =
1
2
(
1−E− max
E′≤E
(1− E ′)IRopt(E ′)
)
, (133)
where E is the error rate, and (max
x′≤x
f(x′)) denotes the maximum value of a
function f(x′) for x′ ≤ x. Also in Eq. (133), IRopt(E ′) is the maximum Renyi
information gain on corrected data by the eavesdropping probe, conditional
on fixed error rate E ′. The asymptotic secrecy capacity, Eq. (133), is based on
the definition of average secrecy capacity, Eq. (127), as given in the literature
[19], however it is important to emphasize that the condition of maximum
Renyi information gain by the eavesdropper may be overly conservative (See
Section VI of Bennett, et al [9]).
Substituting Eq. (105) in Eq. (133), one obtains for the asymptotic secrecy
capacity [13]:
C ′s|q=0,n→∞,ξ→0 =

1
2
(
1− E− max
E′≤E
(1−E ′) log2
[
2−
(
1+(1−2 csc2 2α)E
′
1−E′
)2])
, α ≤ pi/8
1
2
(
1− E− max
E′≤E
(1−E ′) log2
[
2−
(
1+(1−2 sec2 2α)E
′
1−E′
)2])
, α ≥ pi/8
.
(134)
For α = pi/8, Eq. (134) also agrees with [19]. It is evident from Eqs. (104),
(105), and (134) that as a function of α, for fixed error rate, the overlap of
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correlated probe states is greatest, the Renyi information gain by the probe
is least, and the secrecy capacity is greatest for α = pi/8, which corresponds
to the standard BB84 protocol [3] with θ= pi/4.
8 SUMMARY
The maximum Renyi information gain, Eq. (105), by a Fuchs-Peres probe
[11,15] is calculated for varying angle between the signal bases in the four-
state protocol [3] of quantum key distribution. Two sets of optimized probe
parameters, Eqs. (99) and (100) for α ≤ pi/8, and Eqs. (101) and (102) for
α ≥ pi/8, are found to yield the optimization. Only a subset of one of
these sets was found previously [11], for α = pi/8 (Eq. (100) with sin λ = 0
and α = pi/8, or equivalently Eq. (90) with sinλ = 0). When the angle
between the signal bases is the standard 45 degrees (α = pi/8), the result
of Slutsky, Rao, Sun, and Fainman [11] is recovered. Also, it was shown by
explicit calculations that Eq. (105) gives the maximum information gain by
the probe for a representative range of values of α. Also, the maximum Renyi
information, Eq. (105), for constant error rate, increases as α decreases below
pi/8, or increases above pi/8.
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Also for α = pi/8, an additional set of optimum probe parameters, Eq.
(119) previously ignored, has been found. A detailed comparison has been
made between the optimizations of Ref. [12] and Ref. [11]. The reasons why
the optimization of Ref. [11] (Eq. (106) above) did not yield the complete set
of optimum probe parameters are because, in one approach considered there,
the restriction in applicability of Eq. (28) was ignored. Also the parameter µ
was unecessively restricted in Eq. (106).
Next, following a review of the process of key distillation from the quan-
tum transmission in quantum key distribution, the asymptotic secrecy ca-
pacity, Eq. (134), of the four-state protocol has been calculated for the case
of an individual attack in which the eavesdropping probe is entangled with
the signal states, and states of the probe become correlated with the states
measured by the legitimate receiver. The calculation generalizes earlier work
to include an arbitrary angle between the signal bases.
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A Possible Extrema
In this appendix, the sets of conditions for the existence of possible extrema
of the overlap of correlated probe states are determined by using Eqs. (69)–
(71). Also, the possible extrema and the associated probe parameters are
calculated. First, substituting Eq. (68) in Eq. (69), one obtains
∂q
∂λ
+
q − 1 + 2E[
4 (1− E)2 − c2 sin2 2α
] sin2 2α c ∂c
∂λ
= 0. (A-1)
Using Eqs. (67) and (10), it follows that
∂q
∂λ
= −2 (cosλ sinλ) {(2− tan2 2α) [cot2 2α− cos 2θ (sin 2φ+ cot2 2α)]
+ sin 2φ [1 + (1− tan2 2α) cos 2θ]} ,
(A-2)
c
∂c
∂λ
= −2 cos3 λ sinλ sin2 2θ cos2 2φ. (A-3)
Then substituting Eqs. (A-2) and (A-3) in Eq. (A-1), one requires
sinλ cosλF1(λ, θ, φ) = 0, (A-4)
where
F1(λ, θ, φ) = 2 {(2− tan2 2α) [cot2 2α− cos 2θ (sin 2φ+ cot2 2α)]
+ sin 2φ [1 + (1− tan2 2α) cos 2θ]}
+ 2(q−1+2E)
4(1−E)2−c2 sin2 2α
sin2 2α cos2 λ sin2 2θ cos2 2φ.
(A-5)
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Next, substituting Eq. (68) in Eq. (70), one obtains
∂q
∂θ
+
q − 1 + 2E[
4 (1− E)2 − c2 sin2 2α
] sin2 2α c∂c
∂θ
= 0. (A-6)
Using Eqs. (67) and (10), it follows that
∂q
∂θ
= 2 sin 2θ cos2 λ
(
sin 2φ+ 2 cot2 2α− 1
)
, (A-7)
c
∂c
∂θ
= 2 sin 2θ cos4 λ cos 2θ cos2 2φ. (A-8)
Then substituting Eqs. (A-7) and (A-8) in Eq. (A-6), one requires
sin 2θ cos2 λF2(λ, θ, φ) = 0, (A-9)
where
F2(λ, θ, φ) = 2 (sin 2φ+ 2 cot
2 2α− 1)
+ 2(q−1+2E)
[4(1−E)2−c2 sin2 2α]
sin2 2α cos2 λ cos 2θ cos2 2φ.
.
(A-10)
Next, substituting Eq. (68) in Eq. (71), one obtains
∂q
∂φ
+
q − 1 + 2E[
4 (1− E)2 − c2 sin2 2α
] sin2 2α c ∂c
∂φ
= 0. (A-11)
Using Eqs. (67) and (10), one gets
∂q
∂φ
= 2 cos2 λ cos 2φ (1− cos 2θ) , (A-12)
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c
∂c
∂φ
= −2 cos4 λ sin2 2θ sin 2φ cos 2φ. (A-13)
Then substituting Eqs. (A-12) and (A-13) in Eq. (A-11), one requires
cos2 λ cos 2φF3(λ, θ, φ) = 0, (A-14)
where
F3(λ, θ, φ) = 2 (1− cos 2θ)
− 2(q−1+2E)
[4(1−E)2−c2 sin2 2α]
sin2 2α cos2 λ sin2 2θ sin 2φ.
(A-15)
Summarizing Eqs. (A-4), (A-9), and (A-14), possible extrema of the over-
lap of correlated probe states are determined by
(a) sinλ cosλF1(λ, θ, φ) = 0, (A-16)
(b) sin 2θ cos2 λF2(λ, θ, φ) = 0, (A-17)
(c) cos2 λ cos 2φF3(λ, θ, φ) = 0. (A-18)
Three possible ways of satisfying Eq. (A-16) are
(a1) sinλ = 0, (A-19)
(a2) cos λ = 0, (A-20)
(a3) F1 = 0. (A-21)
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Two possible ways of satisfying Eq. (A-19) and (A-17) are
(a11) sinλ = 0, sin 2θ = 0, (A-22)
(a12) sinλ = 0, F2 = 0. (A-23)
Two possible ways of satisfying Eqs. (A-22) and (A-18), and therefore also
Eqs. (A-16) and (A-17), are
(a111) sin λ = 0, sin 2θ = 0, cos 2φ = 0, (A-24)
(a112) sinλ = 0, sin 2θ = 0, F3 = 0. (A-25)
Two possible ways of satisfying Eqs. (A-23) and (A-18), and therefore also
Eqs. (A-16) and (A-17), are
(a121) sinλ = 0, cos 2φ = 0, F2 = 0, (A-26)
(a122) sinλ = 0, F2 = 0, F3 = 0. (A-27)
Equation (A-20) satisfies Eq. (A-17) and (A-18). Therefore, another way
of satisfying Eqs. (A-16)–(A-18) is
(a2) cos λ = 0. (A-28)
Three possible ways of satisfying Eqs. (A-21) and (A-17) are
(c1) F1 = 0, sin 2θ = 0, (A-29)
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(c2) F1 = 0, cosλ = 0, (A-30)
(c3) F1 = 0, F2 = 0. (A-31)
Three possible ways of satisfying Eqs. (A-29) and (A-18), and therefore also
Eqs. (A-16) and (A-17), are
(c11) F1 = 0, sin 2θ = 0, cos 2φ = 0, (A-32)
(c12) F1 = 0, sin 2θ = 0, cosλ = 0, (A-33)
(c13) F1 = 0, sin 2θ = 0, F3 = 0. (A-34)
Eq. (A-30) satisfies Eq. (A-18), and therefore, another way of satisfying Eqs. (A-
16)–(A-18) is
(c2) F1 = 0, cosλ = 0. (A-35)
Three possible ways of satisfying Eqs. (A-31) and (A-18), and therefore also
Eqs. (A-16) and (A-17), are
(c31) F1 = 0, F2 = 0, cos 2φ = 0, (A-36)
(c32) F1 = 0, F2 = 0, cosλ = 0, (A-37)
(c33) F1 = 0, F2 = 0, F3 = 0. (A-38)
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Summarizing Eqs. (A-24)–(A-28) and (A-32)–(A-38), possible solutions
to Eqs. (A-16)–(A-18) are determined by
(A) sinλ = 0, sin 2θ = 0, cos 2φ = 0, (A-39)
(B) sinλ = 0, sin 2θ = 0, F3 = 0, (A-40)
(C) sin λ = 0, cos 2φ = 0, F2 = 0, (A-41)
(D) sinλ = 0, F2 = 0, F3 = 0, (A-42)
(E) cosλ = 0, (A-43)
(F) sin 2θ = 0, cos 2φ = 0, F1 = 0, (A-44)
(G) cosλ = 0, sin 2θ = 0, F1 = 0, (A-45)
(H) sin 2θ = 0, F1 = 0, F3 = 0, (A-46)
(I) cosλ = 0, F1 = 0, (A-47)
(J) cos 2φ = 0, F1 = 0, F2 = 0, (A-48)
(K) cosλ = 0, F1 = 0, F2 = 0, (A-49)
(L) F1 = 0, F2 = 0, F3 = 0. (A-50)
First consider possible extrema determined by possibility (B), Eq. (A-40):
sinλ = 0, (A-51)
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sin 2θ = 0, (A-52)
F3 = 0. (A-53)
From Eqs. (A-15), (A-52) and (A-53), it follows that
cos 2θ = 1. (A-54)
Substituting Eqs. (A-51) and (A-54) in Eq. (66), it follows that
sin 2φ = 1− 2E csc2 2α. (A-55)
Next substituting Eqs. (A-51), (A-52), and (A-54) in Eqs. (8)–(11), one ob-
tains
a = sin 2φ, (A-56)
b = sin 2φ, (A-57)
c = 0, (A-58)
d = 1. (A-59)
Then substituting Eqs. (A-55)–(A-59) in Eq. (62), one obtains
Q =
1 + (1− 2 csc2 2α)E
1− E . (A-60)
For α = pi/8, Eq. (A-60) becomes Eq. (57), corresponding to the standard
BB84 optimization [11], as must be the case.
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Next, consider possibility (A), given by Eq. (A-39):
sinλ = 0, (A-61)
sin 2θ = 0, (A-62)
cos 2φ = 0. (A-63)
From Eqs. (A-62) and (A-63), it follows that
cos 2θ = eθ, (A-64)
and
sin 2φ = eφ, . (A-65)
where
eθ = ±1, eφ = ±1. (A-66)
Substituting Eqs. (A-61), (A-64), and (A-65) in Eq. (65), then one requires
E =
1
2
[
1− eθ + eθ (1− eφ) sin2 2α
]
. (A-67)
Next substituting Eqs. (A-61)–(A-66) in Eqs. (8)–(11), one obtains
a = eθeφ, (A-68)
b = eφ, (A-69)
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c = 0, (A-70)
d = eθ. (A-71)
Then substituting Eqs. (A-67)–(A-71) in Eq. (62), one obtains
Q =
eφ (1 + eθ) + eθ (1− eφ) sin2 2α
(1 + eθ)− eθ (1− eφ) sin2 2α . (A-72)
For eθ = ±1 and eφ = +1, Eq. (A-72) yields
Q = 1. (A-73)
For eθ = ±1 and eφ = −1, Eq. (A-72) yields
Q = −1. (A-74)
One concludes that possibility (A), Eq. (A-39), does not yield the minimum
overlap.
Next, consider possibility (C), given by Eq. (A-41):
sinλ = 0, (A-75)
cos 2φ = 0, (A-76)
F2 = 0. (A-77)
Next, substituting Eqs. (A-10) and (A-76) in Eq. (A-77), one obtains
sin 2φ = 1− 2 cot2 2α. (A-78)
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Then combining Eqs. (A-76) and (A-78), one requires:
cot2 2α =
1
2
(1− eφ) , (A-79)
and therefore, using Eq. (A-66), one requires eφ = −1, and
α = pi/8. (A-80)
Furthermore, using Eqs. (A-75), (A-76), and (A-80) in Eq. (66), one requires:
E =
1
2
. (A-81)
Therefore possibility (C) does not yield a solution.
Next consider possibility (D), given by Eq. (A-42):
sinλ = 0, (A-82)
F2 = 0, (A-83)
F3 = 0. (A-84)
Using Eqs. (A-82) and (10), one has
c = sin 2θ cos 2φ. (A-85)
Also, using Eqs. (A-83) and (A-10), one requires
[
q − 1 + 2E
4 (1− E)2 − c2 sin2 2α
]
=
1− 2 cot2 2α− sin 2φ
sin2 2α cos 2θ cos2 2φ
. (A-86)
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Also, Eqs. (A-84) and (A-15) require
[
q − 1 + 2E
4 (1−E)2 − c2 sin2 2α
]
=
1− cos 2θ
sin2 2α sin2 2θ sin 2φ
. (A-87)
Furthermore using Eq. (A-82), Eq. (67) becomes
q = (2− tan2 2α) [cot2 2α− cos 2θ (sin 2φ+ cot2 2α)]
+ sin 2φ [1 + (1− tan2 2α) cos 2θ]− 4E csc2 2α+ 3.
(A-88)
Next equating Eqs. (A-86) and (A-87) requires
(1− 2 cot2 2α− sin 2φ) sin2 2θ sin 2φ
= (1− cos 2θ) cos 2θ cos2 2φ.
(A-89)
Next, multiplying Eq. (66) by sin2λ and substituting Eq. (A-82), one gets
cos 2θ =
1− 2E
1− sin2 2α (1− sin 2φ) . (A-90)
Then substituting Eq. (A-90) in Eq. (A-89), one obtains
(1− 2 cot2 2α− sin 2φ) sin 2φ
×
{[
1− sin2 2α (1− sin 2φ)
]2 − (1− 2E)2}
= (1− 2E) cos2 2φ
[
1− sin2 2α (1− sin 2φ)− (1− 2E)
]
,
(A-91)
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or equivalently,
[
1− sin2 2α (1− sin 2φ)− (1− 2E)
]
{(1− 2E) cos2 2φ
− (1− 2 cot2 2α− sin 2φ) sin 2φ
[
1− sin2 2α (1− sin 2φ) + (1− 2E)
]}
= 0.
(A-92)
Therefore, either
[
1− sin2 2α (1− sin 2φ)− (1− 2E)
]
= 0, (A-93)
or else,
(1− 2E) cos2 2φ− (1− 2 cot2 2α− sin 2φ) sin 2φ
×
[
1− sin2 2α (1− sin 2φ) + (1− 2E)
]
= 0.
(A-94)
Equation (A-93) gives
sin 2φ = 1− 2E csc2 2α, (A-95)
which when substituted in Eq. (A-90) gives
cos 2θ = 1, (A-96)
and substituting Eqs. (A-82), (A-95), (A-96) and (8)–(11) in Eq. (62), one
again obtains the same solution resulting from possibility (B), Eqs. (A-55)–
(A-60). However Eq. (A-95) must also be compatible with the remaining
requirements if possibility (D) is to represent a solution.
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Alternatively, one has Eq. (A-94), which becomes the cubic:
a1 sin
3 2φ+ a2 sin
2 2φ+ a3 sin 2φ+ a4 = 0, (A-97)
where
a1 = sin
2 2α, (A-98)
a2 = 3− 4 sin2 2α, (A-99)
a3 =
(
2E − cos2 2α− 1
) (
1− 2 cot2 2α
)
, (A-100)
a4 = (1− 2E). (A-101)
The possible solutions to the cubic Eq. (A-97) are given by
sin 2φ = x − p
3
, (A-102)
sin 2φ = x+ − p
3
, (A-103)
sin 2φ = x− − p
3
, (A-104)
where
x = c+ + c−, (A-105)
x± = −1
2
(c+ + c−)± 3
1/2
2
i (c+ − c−) , (A-106)
c± =

−B
2
±
(
B2
4
+
A3
27
)1/2
1/3
, (A-107)
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A =
1
3
(
3q − p2
)
, (A-108)
B =
1
27
(
2p3 − 9pq + 27r
)
, (A-109)
p =
a2
a1
, (A-110)
q =
a3
a1
, (A-111)
r =
a4
a1
. (A-112)
Next, substituting Eqs. (A-85) and (A-90) in Eq. (A-87), one obtains
[
2E − sin2 2α (1− sin 2φ)
] [
4 (1− E)2 − [2(1−E)−sin
2 2α(1−sin 2φ)]
[1−sin2 2α(1−sin 2φ)]
2
×
{[
2E − sin2 2α (1− sin 2φ)
]
sin2 2α cos2 2φ+
[
1− sin2 2α (1− sin 2φ)
]
× (q − 1 + 2E) sin2 2α sin 2φ
}]
= 0.
(A-113)
Therefore, either
[
2E − sin2 2α (1− sin 2φ)
]
= 0, (A-114)
or else,
4 (1− E)2 = [2(1−E)−sin
2 2α(1−sin 2φ)]
[1−sin2 2α(1−sin 2φ)]
2
×
{[
2E − sin2 2α (1− sin 2φ)
]
sin2 2α cos2 2φ+
[
1− sin2 2α (1− sin 2φ)
]
× (q − 1 + 2E) sin2 2α sin 2φ
}
.
(A-115)
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Equation (A-114) gives
sin 2φ = 1− 2E csc2 2α, (A-116)
which together with Eqs. (A-90), (A-82), (8)–(11), and (62) again yields the
same result as possibility (B), Eqs. (A-55)–(A-60). However, Eqs. (A-95) and
(A-116) must also be compatible with the remaining restrictions, if possibility
(D) is to represent a solution.
Alternatively, one has Eq. (A-115). The quantity q appearing in Eq. (A-
115) and given by Eq. (A-88) reduces using Eq. (A-90) to
q = sin 2φ+
(1 + sin 2φ) (1− 2E)
cos2 2α + sin2 2α sin 2φ
. (A-117)
Then substituting Eq. (A-117) in Eq. (A-115), one obtains the cubic:
b1Λ
3 + b2Λ
2 + b3Λ+ b4 = 0, (A-118)
where
Λ = cos2 2α + sin2 2α sin 2φ, (A-119)
b1 = (1− 2E)
(
1− 2 csc2 2α
)
, (A-120)
b2 = 4(1− E)2 − sin2 2α+ (1− 2E)2 (1− 2 csc2 2α)
−(1− 2E) (1 + cos2 2α− 4 cot2 2α) ,
(A-121)
60
b3 = −(1− 2E)2
(
1 + cos2 2α− 4 cot2 2α
)
+ (1− 2E) cos2 2α
(
1− 2 cot2 2α
)
,
(A-122)
b4 = (1− 2E)2
(
1− 2 cos2 2α cot2 2α
)
. (A-123)
(In obtaining Eq. (A-118), an overall factor of Λ was removed and ignored,
since Λ = 0 can only be satisfied if E = 1/2.)
Next, substituting Eqs. (A-85), (A-90) and (A-117) in Eq. (A-86), leads
to the quintic:
c1 sin
5 2φ+ c2 sin
4 2φ+ c3 sin
3 2φ+ c4 sin
2 2φ+ c5 sin 2φ+ c6 = 0, (A-124)
where
c1 = sin
6 2α, (A-125)
c2 = sin
4 2α
(
5 cos2 2α+ 2E − 2
)
, (A-126)
c3 = sin
4 2α (5− 12E + 8E2)− sin2 2α cos2 2α(1− 2E)− 2 sin2 2α (1− 2E)2
−2 sin4 2α cos2 2α + 5 sin2 2α cos4 2α− sin6 2α,
(A-127)
c4 = (1− 2 cot2 2α)
[
sin2 2α(1− 2E)2 − 4 sin4 2α(1− E)2 + sin6 2α
− sin2 2α cos4 2α
]
− 2 sin4 2α cos2 2α− sin4 2α(1− 2E)2
+ sin4 2α (1− 2E) + 8 sin2 2α cos2 2α (1− E)2 ,
(A-128)
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c5 = (1− 2 cot2 2α)
[
−8 sin2 2α cos2 2α(1− E)2 + 2 sin4 2α cos2 2α
]
+4 cos4 2α (1− E)2 + sin2 2α
(
2− sin2 2α
)
(1− 2E)2
+ sin2 2α cos2 2α(1− 2E)− sin2 2α cos4 2α,
(A-129)
c6 = (1− 2 cot2 2α)
[
sin2 2α cos4 2α− 4 cos4 2α(1− E)2 − sin2 2α(1− 2E)2
]
+ sin4 2α(1− 2E)2.
(A-130)
In summary, the possibility (D) requires that one of the following three
sets of equations be satisfied:
(i) Eqs. (A-97), (A-118), and (A-124); (A-131)
(ii) Eqs. (A-95), (A-118), and (A-124); (A-132)
(iii) Eqs. (A-95) and (A-124). (A-133)
But none of these alternatives, (i), (ii), or (iii) can be satisfied. It can be
shown numerically that Eqs. (A-97), (A-118), and (A-124) cannot be simul-
taneously satisfied. Evidently, it can also be shown numerically that Eqs. (A-
95) and (A-124) cannot be simultaneously satisfied. (This has been verified
explicitly for α = pi/9, pi/8, and pi/5.) Thus, possibility (D) apparently does
not produce a solution.
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Next, consider possibility (E), given by Eq. (A-43):
cosλ = 0. (A-134)
Substituting Eq. (A-134) in Eq. (66), one has
sin 2µ = 1− 2E csc2 2α. (A-135)
Next substituting Eqs. (A-134) and (A-135) in Eqs. (8)–(11), one obtains
a = 1− 2E csc2 2α, (A-136)
b = 1− 2E csc2 2α, (A-137)
c = 0, (A-138)
d = 1. (A-139)
Then substituting Eqs. (A-136)–(A-139) in Eq. (62), one again obtains Eq. (A-
60). Therefore, possibility (E), Eq. (A-43), gives the same result as possibility
(B), Eq. (A-40). Note however that the probe parameter µ is restricted by
Eq. (A-135), and the probe parameter φ is unrestricted, while for possibility
(B), φ is restricted by Eq. (A-55), and µ is unrestricted. This is addressed in
Section 4.
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Next, consider possibility (F), given by Eq. (A-44):
sin 2θ = 0, (A-140)
cos 2θ = eθ, (A-141)
cos 2φ = 0, (A-142)
sin 2φ = eφ, (A-143)
F1 = 0. (A-144)
Substituting Eqs. (A-5), and (A-140)–(A-143) in Eq. (A-144), one requires
(1− eθ)
[
eφ cot
2 2α
(
2− tan2 2α
)
+ 1
]
= 0, (A-145)
and therefore
eθ = 1. (A-146)
Next substituting Eqs. (A-141), (A-146), and (A-143) in Eq. (66), one gets
sin 2µ =
sin2 2α (1− eφ cos2 λ)− 2E
sin2 2α sin2 λ
. (A-147)
Then substituting Eqs. (A-140)–(A-143), (A-146) and (A-147) in Eqs. (8)–
(11), one again obtains Eqs. (A-136)–(A-139), and (A-60). Thus possibility
(F), Eq. (A-44), also gives the same result as possibility (B), Eq. (A-40). Note
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however that the probe parameters µ and λ are restricted by Eq. (A-147).
This is addressed in Section 4.
Next consider possibility (G), given by Eq. (A-45):
cosλ = 0, (A-148)
sin 2θ = 0 (A-149)
cos 2θ = eθ, (A-150)
F1 = 0. (A-151)
Substituting Eq. (A-148) in Eq. (66), one gets
sin 2µ = 1− 2E csc2 2α. (A-152)
Substituting Eqs. (A-5) and (A-148)–(A-150) in Eq. (A-151), one obtains
(1− eθ)
[
sin 2φ+ cot2 2α
(
2− tan2 2α
)]
= 0. (A-153)
Therefore, one requires
eθ = 1, (A-154)
or alternatively,
sin 2φ = 1− 2 cot2 2α. (A-155)
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Substituting Eqs. (A-148), (A-149), and (A-152) in Eqs. (8)–(11), one again
obtains Eqs. (A-136)–(A-139) and (A-60). The differing values of the probe
parameters are addressed in Section 4.
Next consider possibility (H), given by Eq. (A-46):
sin 2θ = 0 (A-156)
cos 2θ = eθ, (A-157)
F1 = 0, (A-158)
F3 = 0. (A-159)
Substituting Eqs. (A-15) and (A-156) in Eq. (A-159), one gets
cos 2θ = 1, (A-160)
and therefore
eθ = 1 (A-161)
in Eq. (A-157). Next using Eqs. (A-5) and (A-160), one sees that Eq. (A-158)
is satisfied. Also, substituting Eq. (A-160) in Eq. (66), one obtains
sin 2µ =
sin2 2α (1− cos2 λ sin 2φ)− 2E
sin2 2α sin2 λ
. (A-162)
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Then substituting Eqs. (A-156), (A-160), and (A-162) in Eqs. (8)–(11), one
again obtains Eqs. (A-136)–(A-139) and (A-60). The differing values of the
probe parameters are addressed in Section 4.
Next consider possibility (I), given by Eq. (A-47):
cosλ = 0 (A-163)
F1 = 0, (A-164)
Substituting Eqs. (A-163) in Eq. (66), one gets
sin 2µ = 1− 2E csc2 2α. (A-165)
Next substituting Eqs. (A-5) and (A-163) in Eq. (A-164), one obtains
(1− cos 2θ)
[
sin 2φ+ 2 cot2 2α− 1
]
= 0. (A-166)
Therefore one requires
cos 2θ = 1, (A-167)
or else,
sin 2φ = 1− 2 cot2 2α. (A-168)
Using Eqs. (A-163), (A-165), and (A-167) or (A-168) in Eqs. (8)–(11), one
again obtains Eqs. (A-136)–(A-139) and (A-60). The differing values of the
probe parameters are addressed in Section 4.
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Next consider possibility (J), given by Eqs. (A-48):
cos 2φ = 0, (A-169)
sin 2φ = eφ, (A-170)
F1 = 0, (A-171)
F2 = 0. (A-172)
Then substituting Eqs. (A-10) and (A-170) in Eq. (A-172), one gets
cot2 2α =
1
2
(1− eφ) , (A-173)
which cannot be satisfied for arbitrary α. Therefore possibility (J) cannot
represent a solution for arbitrary α. (It is to be noted however that Eq. (A-
173) is satisfied if eρ = −1, and α = pi/8. This particular case is addressed
in Section 6, following Eq. (119).)
Next consider possibility (K), given by Eqs. (A-49):
cosλ = 0, (A-174)
F1 = 0, (A-175)
F2 = 0. (A-176)
68
Substituting Eqs. (A-10) and (A-174) in Eq. (A-176), one obtains
sin 2φ = 1− 2 cot2 2α. (A-177)
Next substituting Eqs. (A-5), (A-174), and (A-177) in Eq. (A-175), one gets
the trivial identity:
(2− tan2 2α) [cot2 2α− cos 2θ (1− cot2 2α)]
+ (1− 2 cot2 2α) [1 + (1− tan2 2α) cos 2θ] = 0
(A-178)
for any cos 2θ. Then substituting Eq. (A-174) in Eq. (66), one obtains
sin 2µ = 1− 2E csc2 2α, (A-179)
and, using Eqs. (A-174), (A-179), (8)–(11), and (62), then Eqs. (A-136)–(A-
139) and (A-60) again follow. The differing values of the probe parameters
are addressed in Section 4.
Next consider possibility (L), given by Eqs. (A-50):
F1 = 0, (A-180)
F2 = 0, (A-181)
F3 = 0. (A-182)
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From Eqs. (A-5) and (A-180), it follows that
sin2 2α cos2 λ
[
2(q−1+2E)
4(1−E)2−c2 sin2 2α
]
=
−2{(2−tan2 2α)[cot2 2α−cos 2θ(sin 2φ+cot2 2α)]+sin 2φ[1+(1−tan2 2α) cos 2θ]}
sin2 2θ cos2 2φ
.
(A-183)
From Eqs. (A-10) and (A-181), one gets
sin2 2α cos2 λ
[
2 (q − 1 + 2E)
4 (1− E)2 − c2 sin2 2α
]
=
−2 (sin 2φ+ 2 cot2 2α− 1)
cos 2θ cos2 2φ
.
(A-184)
From Eqs. (A-15) and (A-182), one gets
sin2 2α cos2 λ
[
2 (q − 1 + 2E)
4 (1− E)2 − c2 sin2 2α
]
=
2 (1− cos 2θ)
sin2 2θ sin 2φ
. (A-185)
Next equating Eqs. (A-183) and (A-185) leads to
cos 2θ = 1, (A-186)
and Eqs. (A-183) and (A-185) are both identically satisfied. But then sub-
stituting Eq. (A-186), (67), and (10) in Eq. (A-184), one obtains
sin2 2α cos2 λ cos2 2φ
[
1 +
(
1− 2 csc2 2α
)
E
]
= −2 (1− E)2
(
sin 2φ+ 2 cot2 2α− 1
)
,
(A-187)
or
cos2 λ =
2 (1− E)2 (1− 2 cot2 2α− sin 2φ)
sin2 2α cos2 2φ [1 + (1− 2 csc2 2α)E] . (A-188)
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Also, substituting Eq. (A-186) in Eq. (66), one obtains
sin 2µ sin2 λ = 1− 2E csc2 2α− cos2 λ sin 2φ. (A-189)
Then substituting Eqs. (A-188) and (A-189) in Eqs. (8)–(11) yields
a = 1− 2E csc2 2α, (A-190)
b = 1− 2E csc2 2α, (A-191)
c = 0, (A-192)
d = 1. (A-193)
Next substituting Eqs. (A-190)–(A-193) in Eq. (62) again leads to
Q =
1 + (1− 2 csc2 2α)E
1− E . (A-194)
The differing values of the probe parameters are addressed in Section 4.
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